AS3320


Whois ASN lookup : (WHOIS AS3320)

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% Information related to 'AS3209 - AS3353'
as-block:       AS3209 - AS3353
descr:          RIPE NCC ASN block
remarks:        These AS Numbers are assigned to network operators in the RIPE NCC service region.
mnt-by:         RIPE-NCC-HM-MNT
created:        2018-11-22T15:27:19Z
last-modified:  2018-11-22T15:27:19Z
source:         RIPE
% Information related to 'AS3320'
% Abuse contact for 'AS3320' is 'auftrag@nic.telekom.de'
aut-num:        AS3320
as-name:        DTAG
org:            ORG-DTA2-RIPE
descr:          Internet service provider operations
remarks:        peering coordinators for AS3320:  
remarks:        abuse reports should be sent to the contacts
                listed in the registry entries for the IP address of the
                offending host system
remarks:        We share the view that for many networks (including ours:-)
                only some abstraction of the actual routing policy should/can
                be published in the IRR.
                Right now we are abstracting to a very essential minimum.
remarks:        the most important and helpful use of the IRR is
                to publish what a network will announce to peers and upstream
                #  we are providing that by means of the AS-set AS3320:AS-DTAG
                #  which we have been keeping up to date all the time
remarks:        we encourage all our neighbors to define and maintain an
                AS-set to describe their announcements, and to register
                all the routes (and have their customers do so as well)
import:         # heavy abstraction hits! well, we are ...
                from AS-ANY # neither peering promiscuously
                accept ANY # nor accepting all junk routes offered...
remarks:        we maintain a list of what our neighbors have told us
                about their announcements towards AS3320 - in terms of
                AS-set (preferred), AS number, route-set
                (and the IRR database used to publish)
remarks:        in fact we apply route filters based on this
                for all neighbors - as far as feasible
remarks:        for data published through the RIPE routing registry
                we generate filters automatically
remarks:        we consider the integration of RIR and routing registry data
                and the application of RPSS authorization a great feature
                of the RIPE routing registry
                #  unfortunately this benefit is not available with any
                #  other IRR database that we know of...
                #  and some of the IRR databases allow essentially any garbage
                #  to be registered without any control - making those databases
                #  quite useless...
export:         to   AS3320:AS-CUSTOMERS # but don't publish that list;
                announce ANY # in general - if they ask for less, we can do
export:         to   AS-ANY   # for peers and others...
                announce AS3320:AS-DTAG
                #   for backwards compatibility the older AS-DTAG
                #   will be kept around for some more time -
                #   defined using just members: AS3320:AS-DTAG
                #   please convert to AS3320:AS-DTAG if you are still
                #   using the old AS-DTAG
remarks:        customers are strongly encouraged to define and maintain
                an AS-set that we will include in the definition
                of AS3320:AS-DTAG (if we are told the name)
remarks:        this will be sufficient to have our peers accept the routes
remarks:        in any case peers - and any network in the Internet -
                is free to apply some selective policy (e.g. prefix
                length based)
                #  but we do not think that any such selective policy
                #  will be based on details of our routing policy omitted
                #  from this aut-num: object
remarks:        unfortunately some customers do not provide usable IRR data;
                we will NOT add to the uncontrolled garbage in the IRR by
                proxy registering in some database that requires no
                authorization
remarks:        we advise customers that routes without IRR registration
                and not covered by AS3320:AS-DTAG may receive less than
                full support by some of our peer networks and other
                parts of the Internet
remarks:        ==============================================================
                IPv6 we do/publish essentially the same like for IPv4
mp-import:      afi ipv6.unicast  # heavy abstraction...
                from AS-ANY # neither peering promiscuously
                accept ANY # nor accepting all junk routes offered...
mp-export:      afi ipv6.unicast
                to   AS3320:AS-CUSTOMERS-V6 # but don't publish that list;
                announce ANY # in general - if they ask for less, we can do
mp-export:      afi ipv6.unicast
                to   AS-ANY   # for peers and others...
                announce AS3320:AS-DTAG-V6
remarks:        ==============================================================
admin-c:        RV32
tech-c:         RV32
status:         ASSIGNED
mnt-by:         RIPE-NCC-END-MNT
tech-c:         BP32-RIPE
mnt-by:         DTAG-RR
created:        1970-01-01T00:00:00Z
last-modified:  2017-11-15T09:13:45Z
source:         RIPE
organisation:   ORG-DTA2-RIPE
org-name:       Deutsche Telekom AG
org-type:       LIR
address:        Eduard-Schopf-Allee 1
address:        D-28217
address:        Bremen
address:        GERMANY
phone:          +4942151555165
fax-no:         +494412344589
admin-c:        DTAG-RIPE
admin-c:        UR661-RIPE
admin-c:        SL7866-RIPE
admin-c:        VZ56-RIPE
admin-c:        REIS1-RIPE
admin-c:        HI56-RIPE
admin-c:        PB4856-RIPE
admin-c:        MBT1-RIPE
admin-c:        BP32-RIPE
admin-c:        LB470-RIPE
admin-c:        RV32
admin-c:        SB15220-RIPE
admin-c:        KUNO2-RIPE
admin-c:        HB3076-RIPE
admin-c:        LF1459-RIPE
admin-c:        KB6787-RIPE
admin-c:        CP12467-RIPE
admin-c:        DS22814-RIPE
admin-c:        ILKA2-RIPE
admin-c:        SL13187-RIPE
admin-c:        JS21561-RIPE
admin-c:        IRIS3-RIPE
abuse-c:        DTAG3-RIPE
mnt-ref:        RIPE-NCC-HM-MNT
mnt-ref:        DTAG-NIC
mnt-by:         RIPE-NCC-HM-MNT
mnt-by:         DTAG-NIC
created:        2004-04-17T11:12:44Z
last-modified:  2019-08-02T05:38:29Z
source:         RIPE # Filtered
person:         Berthold Paffrath
address:        Deutsche Telekom AG, Internet Services
address:        Postfach 2767
address:        D-48014 Muenster
phone:          +49 251 910 351
fax-no:         +49 251 910 399
nic-hdl:        BP32-RIPE
mnt-by:         DTAG-RR
created:        1970-01-01T00:00:00Z
last-modified:  2001-09-21T23:34:28Z
source:         RIPE # Filtered
person:         Ruediger Volk
address:        Deutsche Telekom AG, Zentrum IOT
address:        Postfach 2767
address:        D-48014 Muenster
phone:          +49 251 910 351
fax-no:         +49 251 910 399
nic-hdl:        RV32
mnt-by:         DTAG-RR
created:        1970-01-01T00:00:00Z
last-modified:  2001-09-21T23:34:30Z
source:         RIPE # Filtered
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BLOCK DDOS ATTACKS ASN : 3320

DDoS-attack last 100 logs

Download DDoS Attacks Report AS3320 December 13 2019 16:01:13

IDDateCountryIPCIDRASNCategories
1.2019-12-13 15:42:26
DE
194.76.31.1 194.76.30.0/23 AS3320 ANTI HACKER PROTECTION
2.2019-12-12 01:09:42
DE
93.209.179.162 93.192.0.0/10 AS3320 Potentially Bad Traffic HTTP 1.0
3.2019-12-12 01:06:37
DE
84.182.157.244 84.128.0.0/10 AS3320 Potentially Bad Traffic HTTP 1.0
4.2019-12-12 01:05:12
DE
80.155.188.170 80.152.0.0/14 AS3320 Potentially Bad Traffic HTTP 1.0
5.2019-12-12 01:05:11
DE
80.141.179.141 80.128.0.0/12 AS3320 Potentially Bad Traffic HTTP 1.0
6.2019-12-12 01:05:08
DE
79.249.0.83 79.192.0.0/10 AS3320 Potentially Bad Traffic HTTP 1.0
7.2019-12-12 00:53:03
DE
217.228.189.191 217.224.0.0/11 AS3320 Potentially Bad Traffic HTTP 1.0
8.2019-11-25 19:41:42
DE
217.95.65.153 217.80.0.0/12 AS3320 SERVER Error 403 Forbidden
9.2019-11-25 10:50:51
DE
91.39.86.122 91.0.0.0/10 AS3320 Hackers using SSH (port 22) to attack
10.2019-11-24 00:12:28
DE
46.91.52.172 46.80.0.0/12 AS3320 Hackers using Telnet (port 23) to attack
11.2019-11-22 17:14:38
DE
80.147.190.204 80.144.0.0/13 AS3320 SERVER Error 403 Forbidden
12.2019-11-20 05:52:38
DE
37.80.13.58 37.80.0.0/12 AS3320 Hackers using Telnet (port 23) to attack
13.2019-11-20 03:17:30
DE
31.213.203.210 31.212.0.0/15 AS3320 SERVER Error 403 Forbidden
14.2019-11-17 18:27:24
DE
217.3.84.63 217.0.0.0/13 AS3320 RECIDIVE
15.2019-10-29 00:18:44
DE
193.254.135.252 193.254.134.0/23 AS3320 Hackers using SSH (port 22) to attack
16.2019-10-13 21:11:06
DE
46.79.114.233 46.78.0.0/15 AS3320 SCAN PORT : 80